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Abstract: Cyber security in a supply chain (SC) provides an organization the secure network facilities
to meet its overall business objectives. The integration of technologies has improved business
processes, increased production speed, and reduced distribution costs. However, the increased
interdependencies among various supply chain stakeholders have brought many challenges including
lack of third party audit mechanisms and cascading cyber threats. This has led to attacks such as
the manipulation of the design specifications, alterations, and manipulation during distribution.
The aim of this paper is to investigate and understand supply chain threats. In particular, the paper
contributes towards modeling and analyzing CSC attacks and cyber threat reporting among supply
chain stakeholders. We consider concepts such as goal, actor, attack, TTP, and threat actor relevant to
the supply chain, threat model, and requirements domain, and modeled the attack using the widely
known STIX threat model. The proposed model was analyzed using a running example of a smart
grid case study and an algorithm to model the attack. A discrete probability method for calculating
the conditional probabilities was used to determine the attack propagation and cascading effects, and
the results showed that our approach effectively analyzed the threats. We have recommended a list
of CSC controls to improve the overall security of the studied organization.
Keywords: cyber supply chain; cyber security; attack modeling; smart grid; threat intelligence;
threat actor
1. Introduction
A supply chain (SC) is a collection of different organizations that align their business processes,
goals, objectives, and some components of their systems to third party organizations, suppliers,
consumers and partners [1,2]. Cyber physical systems (CPS) are the integration of computation
and physical process that make a complete system, such as physical components, network systems,
embedded computers, software, and the linking together of devices and sensors for information
sharing [3]. The emergence of CPS, electronic transactions, third party vendors, and banking services
have evolved over time and brought many changes to how the organizations and industries operate.
CPS supply chains have also brought many challenges, such as lack of specific organizational threat
intelligence gatherings, failure to audit third party vendors, lack of security controls, and lack of (cyber
supply chain CSC )risk management. Cyber attacks could impact other supply chain partner systems
due to many reasons such as software errors, vulnerabilities in any SC partner [4]. Examples include
the Saudi Aramco electric-grid cyber attack in 2017, and the Ukraine power grid attack in 2015 [5].
These indicate that supply chain attacks are on the rise and require an attack model and threat analysis
to gather threat intelligence [6]. There are existing attack models, such as MITRE’s kill chain model [6]
that describe the actions an adversary could take to compromise and operate within an organization’s
overall communication network. Attack trees [7] provide a formal and methodical way of describing
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the security of systems based on varying attacks. They use multilevel children within the attack tree,
with a single root node that uses different ways to achieve its goal using leaf nodes and Building
Security in Maturity Model (BSIMM) [8]. These works are important and contribute to the cyber threat
modeling knowledge domain. However, there is a limited focus on supply chain perspective, and
specifically on threats relating to inbound and outbound chain contexts that need adequate analyses to
ensure CSC security.
The main contributions of this paper are threefold. Firstly, we modeled and analyzed the cyber
threats of supply chains organizational context. We integrated concepts from threat intelligence, such as
threat, attack vector, TTP, and control, with concepts from the goal modeling languages, including actor,
goal, and requirement, and from supply chain context including inbound and outbound. Secondly,
we considered widely used industry practices such as the internet security control [9] and STIX threat
model [10] to analyze the threats in the supply chain context. Finally, we used a running example from
a smart grid system to analyze the proposed approach and demonstrate the applicability of the work.
The results showed that we had identified probable CSC threats, risks, and attacks, such as penetration
and manipulation that could impact the studied organizational goal. We ascertained the CSC attack
vector, and modeled attack patterns and gathered threat intelligence that provided an understanding
of adversaries’ motives, capabilities, actions, and intent. We have recommended security controls to
mitigate the CSC threats.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents an overview of related works in
the CSC security environment and the existing threat models, while Section 3 considers the need for
CSC threat modeling and presents the concepts for a proposed meta-model as well as a threat modeling
process and attack algorithms. Section 4 present the analytical and predictive research approach used
to implement the threat modeling theorem and evaluates it by following a running example of a case
study to model CSC attacks. Section 5 provides a discussion of the several observations identified in
the study. Finally, Section 6 presents a conclusion of the study and proposes future works.
2. Related Work
This section provides an overview of the related works on CSC security and smart grid attacks.
Supply chain security in CPS smart grid domains is widely integrated with other organizations and
requires extensive research.
2.1. CSC Security Environment
Supply chain security are mechanisms that are put in place to control, manage, and enhance
the supply chain system to ensure business continuity, protect products, and provide information
assurance. Forty-six cybersecurity attack incidents were reported in the energy sector in 2015, most of
which targeted the IT systems of utilities and vendors [11,12]. Woods and Bochman (2018) provides
an investigation of the operational practices of CSC and risk across the energy, electricity, gas, and
nuclear sectors [4]. The research focused on energy sector flaws due to software vulnerabilities such as
counterfeit, maliciously tainted, or unintentionally tainted software components that were built into
products during design or implementation phase. Here, the components are authorized, authentic,
and have passed validation. Wand and Lu (2013) presented a compressive survey of cybersecurity
issues for smart grids [13]. The authors specifically focused on reviewing and discussing security
requirements, network vulnerabilities and attack countermeasures, secure communications protocols,
and architectures in the smart grid. Sun et al. (2018) proposed a state of the art survey for the most
relevant cyber security studies in power systems [14]. The authors reviewed cyber security test
beds for research that demonstrated cyber security risks and constructed solutions to enhance the
security of smart grid technologies and industry practices and standards. However, the study did not
review CSC from a vendor perspective. Hymayed et al. (2017) identified smart grid vulnerabilities in
TCP/IP communication protocols due to protocol mis-configuration [3]. The authors’ supply chain
risk encompassed IT and Operational Technology (OT) suppliers and buyers as well as non-IT and
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non-OT partners. However, auditing from inbound and outbound supply chains was not discussed
from a specific organizational context.
2.2. Threat Modeling
MITRE’s Adversary Attack, Techniques & Common Knowledge (ATT&CK) is an adversary
model and framework for describing the actions an adversary could take to compromise and operate
within an organizations network. MITRE’s Cyber Attack Lifecycle consists of seven phases, namely:
recon, weaponize, deliver, exploit, control, execute, and maintain. MITRE’s 11 tactic categories
within ATT&CK for organizations were derived from the latter stages of exploit, control, execute, and
maintain [6]. Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) is a comprehensive
dictionary and classification taxonomy of known attacks that could be used by analysts, developers,
testers, and educators to advance community understanding and enhance defense. CAPEC ID438,
ID439, and ID3000 [15] list three key vulnerable spots through which adversaries can exploit CSC, and
these include modification during manufacturing, manipulations during distributions, and various
domain attacks. Within these are various compromises that could be initiated using malware or SQL
injection attacks. Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) (2014) provides a mechanism for prioritizing
software weaknesses in a consistent, flexible, and open manner. CWE identifies weaknesses that are
exploitable in software, which the attacker can make function in a way that was never intended.
The approach allows an organization to prioritize the CWEs most relevant to the organization’s
business mission, goals, and objectives [12]. Structured Threat Information eXpression (STIX) uses
adversary Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP), cyber attack campaign, incidents, courses of
action, exploitation targets, threat actors, and other methods to provide a common mechanism for
adding structured cyber threat intelligence information across a range of use cases for improving
consistency, efficiency, interoperability, and overall situational awareness [10]. The OWASP Top 10
Most Critical Web Application Security Risks identifies the various web application security weakness,
attacks, threat agent, attack vectors, and impacts on organizations [16]. An integrated cyber security
risk management approach considering all aspects of critical infrastructure including vulnerabilities
and attack scenarios is proposed by [17]. The Diamond model is an intrusion analyses model that
describes how an adversary attacks a victim based on two key motivations. The model consists of
four components, namely: adversary, infrastructure, capability, and victim. It has associated features,
such as timestamp, phases, results, directions, methodology, and resources. In the event of an attack,
the model uses the timestamp to identify the phases [18]. Gai et al. (2017) proposed a maximum
attack strategy method of spoofing and jamming on the cognitive radio network, using optimal power
distribution in wireless smart grid networks. The method was effective for causing the DoS attack on
radio frequencies [19]. The authors further proposed a novel homomorphism encryption approach
to tackle both insider and outsider threats that can fully support blended arithmetic operations over
cipher texts [20]. A dynamic privacy protection model was proposed by [21] to address threats
relating to wireless communication. The aim of the model was to ensure data privacy within a scale
of communication without using conventional encryption methods. The Attack graph—or graph
tree—are conceptual diagrams used to analyze how a target can be attacked. The tree-like structure
has multilevel children with a single root used to detect vulnerabilities in the network for analyzing an
effective defense [22].
3. Threat Modeling for Supply Chain Contexts
This section presents the concepts for the proposed approach. Our work contributes towards
identifying and analyzing cyber threats for the CSC domain.
3.1. The Need for Cyber Supply Chain Threat Modeling
Modeling cyber attacks in an SC environment is a proactive way of creating an understanding
and awareness of an adversary’s modes of operations and TTPs. Supply chain security ensures
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business continuity for an organization as it is able to channel its business activities, such as processes,
information, people, and resources of the products and services, to external suppliers, distributors,
and individual customers. Increased interdependencies have brought about CSC threats, risks, attacks,
and vulnerabilities that adversaries could exploit. Therefore, modeling and analyzing these threats
can provide secure protection for a controlled supply chain system. The following are factors that are
influencing supply chain threats:
 Evolution of the cyber supply chain threat landscape;
 Integration of supply chain stakeholders on the cyber threat model;
 Inability to determine cascading threat impacts on inbound and outbound supply chains;
 Evolving threat landscapes affecting the supply chain organisation context
3.2. Conceptual View
As stated previously, we considered concepts from the supply chain, threat modeling, and goal
modeling domains. These concepts and their properties provided us with an in-depth understanding
of the threat actor’s intent, motives, and methods, which was needed to model attacks, analyze, and
derive threat intelligence.
Goal: A goal represents the strategic aim of an organization. Goals are realized by different factors
based on organizational objectives and business processes. Yu (1995) posits that a goal represents
a condition in the world that an actor would like to achieve [2]. To achieve a goal, an organization
must identify the various actors that will ensure the goal is attained or aborted. We considered both
organizational and security goals. An organizational goal is the objectives carried out to meet the
overall organizational strategy and vision, while security goals are control systems put in place to
prevent threats, risks, attacks, and compromises. Security goals emphasize more of the threat actor’s
goal, in which the aim is to attack or abort the main organizational goal. The security goal is to ensure
confidentiality, integrity, and availability for the overall supply chain systems, and its surrounding
context [17].
Actor: An actor describes an entity that has goals and intentions within the system or within
the organizational setting [2,23]. The actors are the employees, suppliers, and distributors, as well as
those with the potential to cause a threat to the supply chain system (which could be different from the
threat actor). Legitimate actors or system users are categorized as organization employees, or users
with permission to access or use the supply chain system. Actors can be recognized either by their
password, process, identity, or privileges. Suppliers are the various organizations on the supply chain
system, including distributors, third party vendors, and suppliers.
A threat actor (adversary or attacker) is characterized as a malicious actor representing a cyber
attack threat, with presumed intent and historically observed behavior [10]. For this study, we defined
a threat actor as an entity that can breach or compromise the supply chain system, such as a person,
user account, or process. Threat actors can be categorized as either intentional or unintentional, and
internal or external. The threat actor is linked to the attack, vulnerability, and TTP in a many-to-many
relationship. We identified threat actors through their capabilities, such as their intent, type of password
used, observed patterns, behavior, history, and motives.
Vulnerability: vulnerabilities are flaws or weakness that can be exploited by a threat actor or
a threat agent. In an SC system, a vulnerable can be identified from various sources, including the
software, network, website, user, process, application, and configuration, or from a third party vendor.
The adversary could insert a hard-coded password as the default administrative setup into the COTS
software and that could be a vulnerability when it is not changed after purchase.
Attack: An attack is any deliberate action or assault on the supply chain system with intent to
compromise its processes, procedures, and delivery of electronic products, information flows, and
services. A supply chain compromise attack is the manipulation of product delivery mechanisms prior
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to receipt by a final consumer [15]. Attack properties include type, pattern, perquisites, and vectors.
Attack pattern is an abstract mechanism for describing how a type of observed attack is executed [24].
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) is a representation of the behavior or modes of
operations of the adversary or threat actor [10]. TTP leverages specific adversary capabilities, behaviors,
and exploits it can use on victims. TTP could be used to gather cyber threat information about the
attack pattern, resources deployed, and exploits exhibited. TTP is relevant for identifying threat actors,
campaigns to provide CSC threat intelligence on adversary’s motives, intended effects, and impact on
an organization. For instance:
 Tactics describe how threat actors operate during the various attack campaigns. This includes how
the adversary carries out reconnaissance for initial intelligence gathering, how the information is
gathered, and how the initial compromises were conducted. For instance, tactics may be to send a
spear phishing email to a group on the supply chain.
 Techniques are the strategies used by the adversary to facilitate the initial compromises such as
tools, skills, and capabilities deployed. This includes how the adversary establishes control,
maneuvers within the supply chain system infrastructures, and exfiltrates data, as well as how to
obfuscate through the system. The adversary conceals the email contents in such a way that is not
obvious to detect.
 Procedures are the set of tactics and techniques put together to perform an attack. Procedures
may vary depending on the threat actor goal, purpose, and nature of the attack. A procedure
includes carrying out reconnaissance on the victim’s systems to identify vulnerable spots, gather
information, access rights, and control mechanisms to determine what could be exploited.
Inbound and outbound supply threats: The inbound and outbound supply chains are the
organizational systems that integrate with third party companies, suppliers, and distributors to
achieve the organizational goal [24]. The inbound suppliers include the external organization and
third party vendors who have remote access to the CSC system and who provide electric power
transmission [25,26]. The threat actor could penetrate the inbound supplier’s system and manipulate
data, or alter the organizations that provide the electronic products and payment services. The third
party vendors purchase the electric power directly and resell it to the consumer. The outbound supply
chain environment is the organization that provides distributed electric power to other organizations,
individuals, and third party vendors. The threat actor could initiate malware or SQL injection attacks
during distribution, causing a misconfiguration of the supply chain system.
CSC requirement: Requirements are the constraints and expectations needed to ensure that
the system supports the stakeholders and business needs. The requirement concept includes
properties such as organizational requirements, business requirements, systems requirements, user
requirements, and operational requirements [10,23]. The organizational requirements contain concepts
that specify the overall organizational environment and how the software will integrate with the
security constraints to achieve the goal.
Risks: Risk is the potential negative impact from an attack. The probabilities of attacks being
initiated from the vendor systems are high, as they represent a single point of failure. Supply chain
risk is the potential for an adversary to sabotage the supply chain, maliciously introduce unwanted
functions, or subvert the design, product, or integrity of the system [17,27]. CSC risk can be categorized
as IT, non-IT, management, or government. IT risks are technical and operational, while non-IT risks
represent organizations, products and services, environmental factors, and natural disasters. Supply
chain risks are cascading risks, as an attack on one party may affect others as the organizations that are
involved in the integration and process chains also increase [28].
Controls: Controls are security strategies and measures that are formulated and implemented
to ensure that the organizational goal and objectives are achieved, and that risks are mitigated with
minimal threat or no threat at all. CSC security controls are managerial, operational, and technical
safeguards or countermeasures employed within an organizational information system to protect
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the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the systems and their information [29]. Due to the
invincible nature of cyber attacks, the organization should establish a collaborative mechanism with
all stakeholders on the supply chain to protect and secure the supply chain systems.
Cyber incident reports: Incident report systems provide CSC attack victims the platform to report
attacks and threats that have occurred, including their impact and the degree of severity. The purpose
is to gather and analyze threat information that can assist organizations and stakeholders to achieve
their security goals. Properties for cyber incident reports include type, date, source, and impact.
They could serve as notification platforms and disseminators of threat information for training and
awareness among third party collaborators, software developers, and security experts.
Threat information sharing: Cyber threat information sharing is a platform that provides the
information necessary to assist an organization in identifying, assessing, monitoring, and responding
to cyber threats [30]. There are rules that govern and protect information sharing, such as information
sensitivity and privacy, sharing designations, and tracking procedures [30,31].
The meta-model shown in Figure 1 depicts the concepts and their relationships. A threat actor
may want to attack the system and exploit vulnerable spots using TTP methods to manipulate the CSC
system. CSC requirements are used to ensure the security goal, and constraints are achieved to meet
the organizational goal. The attack entity is linked to the threat actor, TTP, risks, and threat, as the
properties determine the nature of attacks and probable threats. The CSC requirements, risk, controls,
and cyber incident report could have an effect on the organizational goal as well as the inbound and
outbound supply chains. This interrelationship provides evidence of the degree of threat or cascading
effect of how a particular risk could impact the CSC. The likelihood of an attack becoming a probable
threat is determined by the threat intelligence gathered.
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• Activity 1: Identifying the organizational supply chain environment 
This activity identifies CSC systems and the external organization, suppliers, distributors, 
and third party vendors on the inbound and outbound supply chains. The purpose is to 
identify the vendor’s software, hardware, and network design process and policies. This 
informs strategic management whether the organizational goals are achievable, repeatable, 
and measurable.   
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3.3. Threat Modeling Process
The underlying proces involves a systematic approach to identify the organization’s supply chain
system, internal infrastructures, business processes, attack context, and relevant controls. The process
consists of four main phases, as shown in Figure 2.
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Phase 1: Determining organization objectives
The im of this phase is to ide tify the overall organizational CSC environme t including goals
and requiremen s. It includes thr e activities which are briefly mention below:
 Activity 1: Identifying the organizational supply chain environment This activity identifies CSC
systems and the external organization, suppliers, distributors, and third party vendors on the
inbound and outbound supply chains. The purpose is to identify the vendor’s software, hardware,
and network design process and policies. This informs strategic management whether the
organizational goals are achievable, repeatable, and measurable.
 Activity 2. Define the approach to achieving the goal This activity identifies necessary actions
required to achieve the organizational goals. The organizational goal is to provide safe and reliable
service to consumers, while the security goal is to ensure that the supply chain system is secure,
reliable, for the overall to achieve business continuity and information assurance.
 Activity 3. Capture the CSC requirements This activity involves capturing the overall CSC
requirement on the inbound and outbound supply chains to ensure the security goal and
constraints. The requirements ensure proper integration and interfacing with vendors. Here, the
systems development life cycle (SDLC) concepts are used to capture the requirements.
Phase 2. Attack Process
The attack process identifies the activities of a threat actor and the TTP used to deploy the attack.
The phase involves complex activities as all the stakeholders may have different system components,
requirements, processes, and infrastructures. The attack pattern may be determined based on each
stakeholder’s business goal, objectives, and the size of the business. The activities include:
Activity 1. Attack Steps
In this phase the threat actor explores the organizational system, and the supply inbound and
outbound chains, as shown in Figure 3. The attack steps are as follows:
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Figure 3. Adversary attack steps.
Step 1. Reconnaissance: The adversary carries out research online and uses other social
engineering methods to gather information such as:
 What infrastructure is the organization using: topology, IPs, software, or configurations;
 Profile of the organization, business applications, third party vendors, and other organizations;
 Is the supply chain a corporate and public network system (e.g., virtual private network VPN);
 What type of attack can be initiated (e.g., malware, redirect script, injection, and phishing)? For
instance, the adversary could use passive attack tools such as Nmap or Kali Linux.
Step 2. Experiment: The adversary uses various attack methods (TTP) and tools to penetrate and
gain control of the victim’s systems to try and explore vulnerable spots. For instance:
 The adversary creates an executable malware remotely;
 The adversary inserts a remote access Trojan (RAT), and the malware is installed and executed
when a user downloads or opens it through a spear phishing email.
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Step 3. Exploit: At this stage, the threat actor gains control of the systems and determines the
attack goal. The threat actor penetrates the workstations of the internal users, gains access into the
system resources and the supply chain environment, and manipulates the organization’s products.
Step 4. Command and control: The adversary uses remote access and Advance Persistent Threat
(APT) techniques to establish control of the CSC system, at which point they are able to monitor
business processes and activities, and to manipulate the system, exfiltrate information, and obfuscate.
Phase 3. Attack probability and cascading effects
The probability of a cyber attack on a CSC can be initiated in many ways. A threat actor requires
full control of a compromised system in order to be able to remotely control malware propagation.
Activity 1. Cyber supply chain attack propagation
Cyber attack propagation changes as the supply chain application processes and operational
technologies change. Therefore, it could prove difficult to use any purely quantitative method to
formulate attack scenarios at this moment. Since the scenarios are specific to an organizational context,
we considered subjective judgments to determine the estimated probability of a successful supply
chain attack by using different attack scenarios. The variables that influenced the probability of a
malware propagation attack were as follows:
 Penetration: We assumed that the threat actor could penetrate the vulnerable spots on the inbound
and outbound chain in all the scenarios.
 Manipulation: This stage is where the threat actor gains access into the supply chain system and
can manipulate data. Threat actor motives and intents were determined by the manipulation.
 Severity of attack: The severity of an attack is determined by the extent to which a threat has
propagated to the supply chain system. The severity of the attack and the cascading effect are
used to determine the the required controls to mitigate the attacks. We categorized the attacks as
low, medium, or high in all the scenarios we considered, as there were penetrations available to
the threat actor that corresponded to the level of propagation on the targeted supply chain system.
We considered Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [32] concepts to determine the
severity of attacks as low, medium or high malware propagation. The level of penetration and the
severity of the attack determines the probability of a successful random distribution. The propagation
was determined using a discrete probability scale of 0–100%. The degree of severity of each
manipulation was calculated in percentages as low (15%), medium (16 to 59%), or high (above 60%).
Let,
P: Penetration
M: Manipulation
Pa: Probability of attack
AT: Number of attacks
S: Scenario
n: total numbers of scenarios
Si: attack frequency
Pg: level of propagation
Sa: severity of attack or impact level
Pacc = (access/scenario)
P(scenario) = 1/n, where n: number of scenarios.
ai = P(access/scenario), where i: index
We determined the level of penetration and the extent of manipulation by the percentage score
used (Table 5). The formulae for calculating the conditional probabilities were as follows:
Pacc =
n
å
i=1
P
 
a
s
!
. P(Si) (1)
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Table 5 provide a list of attacks on the vulnerable spots that attackers can penetrate, the extent of
manipulation and the percentage of each attack probability. Thus, we calculated the estimated expected
value for the probability of attack success as:
Pacc =
1
n
n
å
i=1
ai (2)
The goal of the threat actor is twofold: penetration and manipulation. We assumed there were
8 vulnerable spots and 10 targeted devices (AT1–AT10) on the CSC system (Figure 4). The threat
actor’s motive is to acquire a higher level return value by penetrating the command center workstation,
and to maintain command and control using advanced persistent threat methods. Our objective
was to determine the likelihood of an attack, its level of propagation and the cascading effects.
Inputs contained a group of scenarios. We simulated attack scenarios using propagation methods.
The initialization worked by repeatedly scanning input probabilities to determine the most and least
values, then put them together to fill the vulnerability column. Inputs consisted of the following
parameters: For each attack manner using a level of propagation Pg of Si, we considered penetration
(P) and the attack (AT) to determine the propagation. The output results will produce a cascading
effect on the CSC systems. For further clarification, we used concepts from [19] for the penetration
and manipulation attacks. Table 5 illustrates the method and a recursive formula to create the
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Activity 2. Malware threat pr pagation
In a software co promised attack, we identified whether the attack was through manipulation
during distribution or uring manufacturing. We used TTP to determine the actual sources of malware
and whether the course of the attack on the organization CSC was initiated through malware installed
or a malware-executed program. Malware installed virus is one way that malicious code can be
inserted into the computer.
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Algorithm 1 Cascading Effect Algorithm
Input: Propagation Attack Scenarios
Output: Penetration Effects
Initialization
1. Multiply each probability Pa by n.
2. Create array Scenarios and Probability, each of size n
3. For m = 1 to n   1:
1. Find the probability P satisfying Pacc  1
2. Find a probability P (with i 6= s) satisfying Pacc  1
3. Set Probability [i] = Pi
4. Set Scenario [i] = Si
5. Remove P from list of initial probabilities
6. Set Pa = Pa – (1 – pi)
4. Let i be the last probability remaining, which must have a weighted Sa + 1.
5. Set Probability [i] = 1.
6. If, else /“Cascading Effect”/ 1: Pa <——- Si 2: for Si, i>1 do 3: for P * Pa * Si do 4: for M in
Si do 5: if AT = Pa*P+M*Si = >1 then 6: Pg + S1 = Sa 7:
end if 8: end for 9: applying algorithm 1 10: end for 11: End for 12:
Return Table (Contains the attack methods)
Generation
1. Generate a scenario from an n-sided attack; call the side i.
2. Propagate attack that comes up with a probability P[i].
3. If the scenario comes up “P” return i.
4. Otherwise, return scenario [i].
Pseudocode
Start,
1. Multiply each probability by the number of scenarios
2. Create array of scenarios and probability, for each of the number of scenarios
3. For manipulation equals 1 to number of scenarios equal 1:
4. Find the probability P satisfying access divided the scenario that is less or equal 1.
5. Find the probability P (with index less or equal to scenario) satisfying access divided scenario that is more or equal 1
6. Set probability index
7. Set scenario to index
8. Set probability of attack to equal minus 1. /”Remove probability from list of initial probabilities”/
9. Let index be the last with weighted index severity of attack or impact level.
10. If else /”Cascading Effects”/
11. Let Probability of attack (Pa) be more than attack frequency (Si)
12. For attack frequency, if index is more than 1, do (indicate)
13. Multiply the number of penetration P, probability of attack and attack frequency
14. For manipulation in number of attack frequency, do (indicate)
15. If the number of attacks is equal to probability of attacks, multiplied by penetration, plus manipulation, times attack
frequency, are greater than 1?
16. Then calculate
17. Level of propagation and attack frequency is equal to severity of attack or impact level
End
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Activity 3. Probability distribution and manipulation for random attacks
The probability of penetrating a web server on a supply chain system can be very challenging.
The TTP that the threat actor deploys is basically to create a real message that prevents the spam filters
from detecting it and that could generate wrong probabilities. The probability formula for malware
executable emails using spear phishing is:
P =
Pcs (1  r )
v
(3)
Let:
P: probability
Ps: probability of a malware spear phishing penetrating the mail server
C: the number of clicks on the malware
r : the average detection rate of an antivirus program installed on third party vendor system
1  r : probability of the malware avoiding detection
V: total number of views of a malicious message
We used Scenario 3 in Section 5 to calculate the probability distribution.
Phase 4. Threat modeling using STIX
In this phase, we used the STIX visualization (STIXviz) tool to model the attack process. The STIX
tool uses eight constructs such as adversary attack, cyber attack campaign, incidents, exploit targets,
threat actors and TTP to generate a structured cyber threat model [14]. However, for our model, we
adopted some of the constructs to model the activities, such as observable, indicators, campaign,
threat actor, and TTP, to describe the interrelations and actions an attack may take to penetrate and
manipulate the CSC system.
Activity 1. Observable: These are the base constructs that are used to determine the measurable
events pertinent to the operations of computers and the network. [7] These includes technical and
non-technical. We identified all the CSC infrastructures as listed in Phase 1: Activity 1. These included
the network systems, Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA), Remote Terminal Unit
(RTU), Communication devices, and many more.
Activity 2. Indicators: Indicators are parameters that express the nature of the attack and whether
it is imminent, in progress, or has already occurred [24]. We used CSC threat activities, adversary
behaviors, risky events, or state of the incident to determine what could serve as an indicator.
Activity 3. Campaign: The campaign explains the instances of the threat actor pursuing intent,
as observed through sets of incidents and TTP. The intended effect of the threat actor penetrating a
supply chain and manipulating the distribution and delivery channels could be a malware attack that
is being delivered through spear phishing, or rootkit installation attack, as explained in Phase 3.
Activity 4. Threat Actor: The threat actor construct identifies the attacker based on the campaign
activities. Threat Actors are characterized as malicious actors representing a threat including presumed
intent and historically observed behaviors [31].
Activity 5. TTP: TTPs consist of the specific threat actor behaviors exhibited in an attack. The
campaign, indicators, and threat actor activities determine the TTP that are deployed on the supply
chain system as explained in activity 2, 3 and 4. TTP leverages on resources such as tools, capabilities,
and personnel to penetrate and manipulate system.
Activity 6. Exploit target: Exploit targets are the vulnerable spots on the supply chain
infrastructures such as software, network system, or configurations that are targets for exploitation by
the TTP of a threat actor.
Phase 5. Controls: To incorporate controls into a supply chain system, we used knowledge of
actual attacks that have occurred in the past. To ensure proper security controls, the organization must
form a strategic team to identify, investigate, review, and evaluate the supply chain system processes
and applications. We identified the following controls:
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 Directive controls are more strategic, where risks are identified and assigned to specific inbound
and outbound supply chain requirements.
 Preventive controls are policies implemented on associated risk probabilities that are intended to
preclude actions violating policy or increasing third party risk. This includes supply chain risk
assessments and audits.
 Detective controls use attack indicators to identify practices, processes, and tools that identify
and possibly react to security violations. These include firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems
(IDS), and Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) configurations.
 Corrective controls involve measures such as courses of actions and CSC risk management
designed to react to detections of an incident in order to reduce or eliminate the opportunity for
the unwanted event to recur.
 Recovery controls are mechanisms put in place to restore a system to its original state once
an incident has occurred and resulted in compromising integrity or availability. These include
countermeasures, backups, segmentation, and incidence response strategy.
4. Evaluation
In this section, we follow a running example of a smart grid case study to model CSC attacks that
are able to determine the applicability of the threat model empirically. We confirmed the viability of
the resources, the questionnaires used to generate the study context, and the methods used to gather
the data. We investigated the case study and analyze the data gathered to determine the results.
4.1. Data Gathering
For the study, we adopted the analytical and predictive research approach to implement and
evaluate the approach. The rationale for the adoption of analytical research is to look for causal
relationships amongst the data we collected and attempt to measure them using probability distribution
methods. Then, based on qualitative and quantitative analysis, the predictive method was applied to
determine whether a specific phenomenon was likely to appear in a similar situation [33]. Considering
the invincible nature of cyber attacks and the cascading effects that the attacks could have on a CSC
system, we adopt both qualitative and quantitative approaches in our research methods. Both primary
and secondary data were collected. We had meetings and discussions with senior management about
the purpose and scope of the study, then we had a follow-up meeting and interviews with middle
managers who had expertise inside and outside of the organization under study. Data from the
secondary source were collected from the organization’s websites and other online resources.
4.2. Running Example of a Case Study
The Electricity Corporation of Ghana (ECG) distributes electric power to the southern part of
Ghana. ECG provides electricity to about 3.1 million domestic and business customers. ECG core
business processes include distribution, setting up a new connection, network operations, maintenance,
metering, and billing. It ensures the electric power chain distribution of Ghana with over 70% market
share and the largest power distributor in Ghana [34]. ECG is responsible for the distribution of power
in the six administrative southern regions in Ghana. The ECG organizational goal is to provide safe
and reliable high-quality electric service to consumers in the regions by improving system reliability,
improving customer service delivery, reducing system losses, improving operational efficiency, and
improving organizational culture. The ECG distribution network system infrastructure must be able
to accommodate new connections and support the distribution of electric power to homes, businesses,
and third party companies. Recently, the government introduced a rural electrification program
requiring the ECG to include new connections. However, the ECG had difficulty meeting the fast
developing customer base, the increasing demand on its network operations, maintenance, metering,
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and billing systems. It became imperative that ECG deploy a system to speed up fault identification
and restoration, cyber security, reliability, and tolerance.
4.3. Smart Grid Electric Power Infrastructure
To meet the challenges above, the ECG recently commissioned and installed an all-automated
SCADA system that was required for the modification of its existing network. The electricity
distribution network infrastructure uses mesh topologies and SCADA systems as the main
infrastructure supporting the CPS smart grid system.
4.3.1. Application Infrastructures and Core Business Systems
The application infrastructures and the network communications system provide business
operation, processes, communication protocols, and support the distributed control systems (DCS)
and SCADA system. The third party vendor uses Microsoft operating system software and a browser
that connects their systems to the ECG server remotely using public service IPs for the prepaid services.
The ECG’s core business is electric power distribution, and the organizational network infrastructure
and business systems are categorized in Table 1.
Table 1. Electricity Corporation of Ghana (ECG) core businesses systems.
Network Infrastructure Application Systems People/User Controls
Smart Grid Architecture Content Management System/CRM Staff Security/Audit
Mesh Topology HEMS Suppliers Best Practices & Guidelines
SCADA Systems Mobile Devices/Advanced MeteringIntegration Vendors ISO 27001-2 ISMS
UHF Radio Prepaid Distributors
Sub Station Postpaid System Policies
4.3.2. Electric Power Distribution Challenges
The ECG electric distribution system has suffered lots of setbacks over the past decade, including
voltage surges, software errors, and network interruptions. These challenges are some of the factors
that have led to the introduction of prepaid meters or smart meters in Ghana. Prepaid metering or
smart metering is the means of paying for electricity before its consumption. However, this has also
introduced software errors into the system in recent times, such as prepaid card errors and prepaid
meter tampering.
4.3.3. The ECG Supply Chain Organizational Environment
There are seven public institutions involved in the Ghana power sector [33], as well as about two
public–private sectors. There are third party organizations contracted by the ECG that supply the
digital meters the vending machines. The prepaid system operates via a public–private partnership
that is all integrated into the supply chain.
4.4. Study Goal
The goal of this paper is to investigate and understand the cyber security threat in the SC
environment of the study context. In particular, we aim to model threats, and to analyze the threats
and the associated risks and cascading effects. The hypothesis below will determine the extent of
the compromises.
Hypothesis 1: To what extent, can the threat actor penetrate the ECG CSC system on the inbound and outbound
supply chains?
Hypothesis 2: To what extent can the threat actor manipulate the data on the supply chain system and the
delivery mechanisms?
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4.5. The Process
We used the processes and conceptual approaches in Table 2 to support our study.
Table 2. Mapping the case study with the meta-model concept.
Concepts Properties Descriptions
Goal Organizational goal Distribute electric power to customers
Generate utility bills,
Receive payments
Provide vendors remote access to CSC Secure systems
Security goal
Actors Users Employees: internal and external
Suppliers Suppliers
Distributors
Threat actor
A person, user account, or processes that can be
identified by the intent, motives, and capabilities of an
attacker
Requirements Organizational requirement,
Specify high level organizational environment overall
and integrate with the security constraints to achieve
the organizational goal
user categories, ID, stakeholders,
description, acceptance criteria
Supply Chain System Inbound Organizations
Financial institutions
Third party vendors
Individual consumers
Services providers
Outbound
Organizations
Stakeholders
Power transmission company
Sub-stations
Vulnerability
Router, firewall, wifi Remote
services: remote login, remote
command execution
CSC Source and destination, Timestamp,
Dynamic, host configuration
protocol, (DHCP) server logs Domain name,
TCP/UDP port number, media,
MAC address
IP Address
Attack Attack goal Compromise system of:
Attack pattern Malware, spyware, injection
Attack prerequisites Information on vulnerabilities
Attack vectors Mechanisms to deploy attack
TTPs Tactic, Technique, & Procedure
Threat Indicators Determines vulnerabilities, flaws, and loopholes thatcan be exploited by a threat actor or a threat agent
Specific observable patterns
SCS threat activities
Adversary behaviors
Risky events
State of an incident
Phase 1. Attacks on ECG smart grid infrastructure
We consider a smart grid communication path and security application using concepts from the
IEC 61850 Smart Grid Interoperability Guide [35] and NIST Smart Grid Interoperability Standards [36]
with its three-tiered hierarchical structure interconnected with intelligent electronic devices (IED). Tier
1 covers the transmission and distributions domains, using high-bandwidth communication media
such as WiMAX and Fiber on a wireless area network (WAN). The IED monitors and control the
electric power transmission to the distribution system using the pharos monitoring unit (PMU) for
measuring instantaneous bus voltage, line current, and frequency. The command center integrates with
the SCADA system servers and uses a switchboard to establish communication with the IED units [13].
Tier 2 provides a gateway for the Wireless Area Network (WAN) technologies and communication
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utilities to have access to the customers’ premises for the advanced meter infrastructure (AMI) and
demand response applications. It uses a collection of Intelligence Electronic Devices (IED) units to
collect the various Phasor Measuring Units (PMUs). Tier 3 integrates the local area network with the
customer management systems (CMS) and uses the IED to communicate with the smart meter, which
aggregates sensor information from various home appliance devices. We present the attack modeling
concepts and steps in Figure 4.
Activity 1. Determine attacks on the CSC
A Threat Actor may be an internal employer or may come from an external source. Several attacks
can be initiated on the CSC by the threat actor. As indicated in Figure 4, (P) represents Penetration and
(AT) represents Attack.
Tier 1: smart grid integrates with SCADA system servers and uses a switchboard to establish WAN
communication with the IED units.
Tier 2: uses IEDs to connect with AMI and demand response applications.
Tier 3: uses LAN to integrate with the CMS and uses the IED to communicate.
The threat actor uses various attack vectors to gather knowledge about the smart grid system
topology, configurations, protocols, and operational parameters. Table 3 represents a breakdown of
how the threat actors penetrate the systems. We use:
 Penetration (P) to represent how the adversary attacks the system (P1–P6);
 Attack (AT) to represent the devices that were under attack (AT1–AT10);
 Steps (ST) to represent the steps the threat actor followed to attack (ST1–ST4).
Table 3. Smart grid SCS and potential security threats.
Attack Vector Type CSC System Target Position Steps
Penetrating
External
CSC WAN/firewall P1 ST1
CSC vendor remote access P2 ST2
IED-supported
communication P3 ST3
Workstation, CMS, HEMS P4 ST4
Command center firewall P5 ST4
Internal
Organizational LAN firewall AT4
Command center SCADA P6 ST4
Attacking Devices under cyber
attack
Firewall AT1–AT4
CSC vendors AT5
IEDs AT6
CMS AT7
HEMS AT8
Handheld devices AT9
Vendor devices AT 10
Activity 2: Determine attack vectors
Here we discuss the attack vectors from Table 3, and follow the attack step in Section 4, to explain
the attack vectors using the case study.
 P1. Threat actor penetrates the system from a remote source through the firewall refer Step 1.
 P2. Threat actor gains remote access through Vendor Systems refer Step 2.
 P3. Threat actor exploits the IED that supports the communication systems refer Step 3.
 P4. Threat actor manipulates the workstations, server, and handheld devices refer Step 4.
 P5. Threat actor penetrates the command center firewall refer Step 4.
 P6. Threat actor gains access into the command center and takes controls of the SCADA servers,
manipulating, exfiltrating, and obfuscating.
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 AT1. The internal threat actor uses social engineering, ID theft, and administrative privileges to
gain access through the LAN firewall to manipulate the system refer Step 4.
Activity 3: Detect devices under cyber attack
 AT1–AT4. Indicates that the firewall devices affected are under cyber attack.
 AT5. CSC vendor systems are under attack.
 AT6. IEDs are under attacks.
 AT7. CMS server is under attack.
AT8. No funding body have any role in the design of the study; in the collection, analyses, or
interpretation of data; in the writing of the manuscript, or in the decision to publish the results”.
 (HEMS) server is under attack.
 AT9. Handheld devices are under attack.
 A10. Vendor devices are under attack.
Phase 2: Attack scenarios
An attack scenario is used to determine the vulnerable spots and where penetrations occurred
between the variables, as listed in Table 4.
Table 4. Probability and threat indicators.
Scenario Vulnerable Spots Penetration Manipulation% Probability Threat Indicators
1 Firewall Y 70 High Wrong Firewall
2 IDS/IPS Y 60 High Configuration
3 Vendor Y 80 High Audit
4 Network Y 40 Medium Sub-netting
5 IP Y 55 Medium Segmentation
6 Database Y 75 High Sanitizations
7 Software Y 75 High Reprogram
8 Website Y 90 High SSL/TLS
Scenario 1. Remote attack on the CSC system
The organization security team found that an adversary had intruded in the CSC system.
The threat actor had compromised the workstation of the CMS that interfaced with suppliers,
distributors, and third party vendors. The organization’s electronic products had been altered for
some time. The CMS generated inaccurate customer electricity consumptions, which compromised
the amount the customers were paying for their utility bills, their online payments, and third party
vendor systems. The organization used two types of payment systems, the prepaid system and
postpaid system, that were all integrated into the CMS and HEMS. Using the formula for calculating
conditional probabilities and Activity 1 and Table 4, we determined the vulnerable spots, the severities
of manipulation in percentages, and threat indicators.
Scenario 2: Spear phishing email attack
A spear phishing email was sent to the organizational web server and it was noticed that the
malware had infected 200 staff email addresses, with 160 that had their data corrupted, 27 that were
detected by the spam filter, and 205 that were not detected. The number of users that clicked on the
attachment was 220. The number of clicks on the malware attached message divided by the total
number of viewers of that message represents the probability of opening the infected email. Following
the formula in Phase 3 Activity 3, we used discrete probability to calculate the probability of emails
that were infected on the supply chain as follows:
P =
PsC(1  r )
v
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Results:
P = PsC(1 r )/v
Pa = 200(220 27)/205
Therefore, P = 188.29 (the probability of an opened and infected email)
Activity 4. Probability theorem
Probability (P) is the likelihood that an attack or event will happen. For the study, we identified
10 types of attacks that could be initiated on the supply chain system. These attacks were spyware,
ransomware, RAT, spear phishing, SQL injection, XSS, DoS, redirect script, cross site request forgery,
session hijacking, and hard-coded passwords. To pick an attack such as malware or SQL injection
from a scenario of 10 attacks where spyware, ransomware, RAT, and spear phishing attacks were all
classified as malware was 1/10.
For a scenario where the second attack is conditional on the first (e.g., manipulation is dependent
on penetration), we used the formula:
P(A or B) = P(A) + P(B)   P(A and B)
P(A + B) = P(A)  P(B/A) Where {B/A is ‘B given A’}
Bayesian Probability Theorem
We used Bayes’ theorem to explain the dependent probability. Bayes’ theorem could be used
calculate the probability that manipulation would occur and cause a cascading effect on the supply
chain based on some pieces of evidence that were present. For a scenario where the second attack is
conditional on the first, (manipulation is dependent on penetration) we determined that if, for instance,
an organization had 370 manipulations out of 796 penetrations within a given period in a supply chain
environment, then in simple terms the probability is 370/796 = 0.046 (<50%). However, suppose we
are not sure whether the systems were manipulated or not and the attacks cascaded, we can use the
following figures as evidence to generate a probability distribution method to determine the weight of
evidence as follows:
 Penetration manipulation (160) and cascading (210);
 No cascading manipulation (236) and cascading (523).
The probability (Pa) that there will be a manipulation (M) after penetration (P) given that it also
cascaded is
Pa(P|M) = Pa(A)  Pa (M|P) / Pa (M)
where Pa (M|A) / Pa(M) is the weight of evidence, calculate:
Pa(P) = 370/796 = 0.046; Pa(M|P) = 160/37 = 0.432
Pa(M) = (160 + 236)/796 = 0.317
Therefore:
Pa(A|B) = 0.046  0.462/0.317 = 0.062
Conversely, the likelihood of a penetration given no manipulation is = 0.038
Future Internet 2019, 11, 63 19 of 25
4.6. Modeling Attack using STIXviz Tool
The STIXviz tool indicates the process flow and schema of how an adversary initiated a malware
attack on the ECG electric power products to penetrate and manipulate data. We followed the threat
modeling concepts from Sections 4 and 5.1 to model the CSC attacks. The campaign, the indicator,
the threat actor, and the TTP are the main icons in Figure 5. Under them are sub-icons that depict
the process flows. The campaign explained the TTP and intended effects of the threat actor—that is,
the malware delivery and the installed rootkit malware, as explained in Section 4.1. The indicator
icon displays the nature of the malicious activities on the supply chain and attributes them to a threat
actor. The threat actor icon identifies the attacker based on the campaign activities. The TTP icon uses
the campaign, indicators, and threat actor activities to determine the TTPs deployed on the supply
chain system.
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4.7. Cyber Supply Chain Controls
To address the questions above in line with organizational objectives, Table 5 provides a lists of
security control recomm ndations.
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Table 5. Cyber Supply Chain Controls.
No Control Principle Critical Security Purpose Implement Activity
1 Inventory and Control ofHardware Assets
Actively manage (inventory,
track, and correct) all hardware
devices on the network so that
only authorized devices are
given access.
Network, laptops, (BYOD)
might be out of synch with
security updates or might
already be compromised.
Attackers can take
advantage of hardware
installed but not configured
and patched with security
updates until later.
Utilize active discovery tool
to identify devices connected
to network and update the
hardware asset inventory.
Maintain up-to-date
inventory of stored assets or
process information and
hardware, whether
connected to network or not.
2 Inventory and Control ofSoftware Assets
Manage CSC network so that
only authorized software is
installed. Unauthorized
software is found and
prevented from installation
or execution.
Attackers scan targets sites
with vulnerable software
that can be remotely
exploited and distribute
hostile web pages or to
third-party sites.
Managing and control of all
software plays a critical role
in planning, backup,
incident response,
and recovery.
Utilize inventory tools
throughout to automate the
documentation of all
software on business
systems.
Utilize application
whitelisting technology on
all assets to ensure that only
authorized software
executes.
3
Continuous
Vulnerability
Management
Continuously assess and take
action on new information in
order to identify
vulnerabilities, remediate, and
minimize the window of
opportunity for attacks.
Understanding and
managing vulnerabilities
must become a continuous
activity, requiring significant
time, attention, and
resources.
Threat actors try to exploit
vulnerabilities and attack
victim’s systems before the
organization becomes aware.
Due to lack of CSC
risk assessment.
Organizations that do not
scan for vulnerabilities and
proactively address
discovered flaws face a
significant likelihood of
having their computer
systems compromised.
Utilize an up-to-date
compliant vulnerability
scanning tool to
automatically scan all
systems to identify potential
vulnerabilities, Deploy
automated security updates.
4 Controlled use ofAdmin Privileges
Not changing hard-coded
password default. Impacts on
the processes and tools used to
track, control, and prevent the
correct use, assignment, and
configuration of
administrative privileges.
Misuse of admin privileges
is a primary method for
attacks to spread inside a
target system.
A privileged user can open a
malicious email attachment
or website hosting exploited
browsers. Second guessing
password for an
administrative user.
Change default hard-coded
password. Ensure all users
with administrative account
access use a dedicated or
secondary account for
elevated activities.
Configure systems to issue a
log entry and alert when an
account is added to or
removed from any group
assigned
administrative privileges.
5
Secure Configuration for
Hardware and Software
on Mobile Device
Laptop and Servers
Implement and manage (track,
report, correct) security
configuration of assets by
using configuration
management and change
control process.
Developing configuration
settings with good security
properties is complex. It
requires system analysis.
Implement regular security
updates on configuration.
Ensure vulnerabilities are
reported and update to
support new operational
requirements.
Maintain documented,
standard security
configuration standards for
all authorized operating
systems and software.
Utilize Security Content
Automation Protocol
compliant configuration
monitoring system. Verify
security configuration.
Catalog approved exceptions
and alerts in the event of
unauthorized changes
6
Maintenance,
Monitoring, and
Analysis of Audit Logs
Collect and analyze audit logs
of events that could help
detect, or recover from
an attack.
Deficiencies in loggings and
analysis allow attacker to
hide location and activities.
Keep logging records for
audit and compliance
purposes. Attackers hide
their trails nowadays.
Ensure that local logging has
been enabled on all systems
and networking devices.
Ensure that appropriate logs
are being aggregated to a
central log management
system for analysis
and review.
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5. Discussions
We made several observations from the running example. The study revealed that there were
several threats and vulnerabilities that the threat actor could exploit on the electric power smart grid
CSC system. These attacks include malware, redirect script, or SQL injection. We discuss the attack
vectors used by adversaries as follows:
5.1. Threat Actor Motivation and Intent
The motives and intent of the threat actor may not be known automatically. However, we could
use the TTP deployed by the attacker to determine the motive and intention. For instance, design
specification establishes the contractual agreement of a final product deliverable after the system
requirements have been captured in a software development process. The threat actor could
deliberately insert a code to manipulate data, especially in software that is bought off the shelf
to prevent the product from achieving the organizational goal. A threat actor may insert a redirect
script or exfiltration codes into the actual source during the software development stage to gain access
and manipulate the public and private source code repositories. The purpose would be to attack
an entity involved in the supply chain lifecycle, such as the organization’s website, web server, or
database server that connects with a third party financial institution network. With a little knowledge
of the software composition, the adversary may cause an APT attack and replace legitimate software
with modified versions or counterfeit products. The attacker could use SQL injection attacks to gain
access to customers’ data and could redirect shipments and deliveries.
The attack could have an impact on several dimensions, such as reputational damage to the
organization, loss of customer confidence, loss of customer data, sensitive data exposure, or litigation
issues. An example is the malicious alteration of functionalities of the transistors in an integrated
circuit, which could cause an electric power consumption reading to oscillate and generate wrong
estimates to customers, especially on an industrial scale. This attack could undermine the integrity
of the data and software, such as the calculation of charges that determine the total cost of a product
at the stage of the distribution channel. The adversary could use a session hijacking attack to take
advantage of the insecure default configurations to gain access to the system and change delivery
channels. The threat actor could then break the authentication and session management functions,
compromise passwords, and gain access to the command center CSC systems especially the demand
response, legacy, and billing systems. The cyber physical and cyber digital components of the system
could be attacked by adversaries using malware, SQL injection, APT, or command and control attacks
on the infrastructure. They could change configurations remotely on the AMI head-end and control
meter readings, and send wrong utility measurements, including sending connect and disconnect
commands to the electricity services abruptly.
5.2. Attack on the Cyber Physical Components
Cyber physical components are used for the automation of electric power generation, transmission,
and distribution processes, and can be attacked due to their close interactions with smart meters and the
meter data management system (MDMS) that manages data and the third party vendors. Adversaries
can breach the source code by using malware or spyware on the supply chain system and remotely
manipulate the CPS smart grid software components that interact with smart meters, organizations,
and vendors on the distribution mechanism. Home appliances connected directly to smart meters
can be compromised as they interact in a cyber physical environment. Utility companies may use
industrial and non-industrial smart meters to control the amount of energy consumed by various
organizations, industries, and homes. Further observations show that electric power consumers can
now pay their bill using online banking services directly to the utility companies and third party
vendors. Here, the customer card details could be stolen using session hijacking attacks as they process
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payments online. The attacker logs in and infiltrates other organization networks using the stolen
login details after the customer has logged out to gain unauthorized access and cause APT attacks.
5.3. Threat Modeling and Analyses
Threat modeling and analysis looks at the various instances of how threat actors pursuing an
intent and exploit it, such as an adversary’s motives, opportunities, and the methods deployed by
the threat actor. We analyzed the pattern of behaviors as observed through sets of incidents and
the TTP used across the organization’s supply chain with third parties. We characterized threat
actor activities, including presumed intent and historically observed behavior, for the purpose of
ascertaining the current threats that could be exploited. The intelligence gathered provides us with an
understanding of the adversaries’ capabilities, actions, and intents of the organizational supply chain
domain. We asking the following questions as we look to investigate further attacks for our analyses
and threat intelligence gatherings:
 What attacks have occurred before (malware, SQL injection, session hijacking, XSS);
 How did they occur (causes of action and intrusion sets);
 Who are the threat actors (internal and external staff, adversaries, and threat actors);
 What are the likely occurrences (risk assessments, indicators);
 How can they be detected (penetration tests, vulnerability assessments, threat modeling);
 How can they be recognized (threat intelligence models);
 How can they be mitigated (risk management, controls, policies, regular updates, insurance,
and awareness).
5.4. STIX Model
For the STIX model, we used supply chain threat activities, adversary behaviors, risky events,
and state of an incident to determine what could serve as a threat indicator. CSC attack incidents and
course of actions provided information about the nature of cyber attack indicators and TTPs that can
be deployed on the supply chain, especially from the third party vendor’s point.
5.5. Comparing Results with Other Works
There is a large body of literature on the subject of cyber supply chain security. Comparing our
work with other works, we reviewed proposed attack models that could be used to detect and analyze
threats in Section 2 [6,13,14]. [32–34] propose an attack method for spoofing and jamming on the
cognitive radio network, algorithms for a novel homomorphism encryption, and a dynamic privacy
protection model. However, our work looked at supply chain security from inbound and outbound
chains. The paper looked at penetration and manipulation attacks from organizational perspectives.
We modeled and analyzed the cyber threat from the supply chain perspective, and used running
examples to evaluate the model and proposed controls required to demonstrate the applicability of
the work. The results show that we have identified probable CSC threats, risks, and attacks, such as
penetration and manipulation, that could impact the organizational goal.
6. Conclusions
Cyber security in supply chain organizational environment has become a major challenge due to
the integration and interrelationships of various stakeholder systems that are interconnected to achieve
organizational goals. This paper attempts to analyze the security of such systems by considering
an attack model using concepts such as goal, actor, attack, TTP, and threat actor that are relevant to
the supply chain context along with their interdependencies. To demonstrate the applicability of the
model, we used the STIXviz tool to model attacks for gathering threat intelligence within the CPS
smart grid network and third party organizational system. The study showed that the adversary’s goal
is to penetrate the inbound and outbound supply chains and manipulate data. The scenarios provided
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us an understanding of the various instances of threat actor’s methods of pursuing an intent and
exploitation. We have observed the threat actors motives and methods, as well as the cascading effects
of the attacks. The results showed that modeling CSC attacks and analyzing pattern of behaviors as
observed through the sets of scenarios and the TTP used assisted in understanding the security risks.
To ensure CSC controls and proper mitigations, it is required that all stakeholders ensure regular third
party auditing and implementation of security policies in line with international standards. We have
provided a table with a list of supply chain security controls that can manage and enhance the supply
chain system to ensure business continuity, protect products and delivery mechanisms, and provide
information assurance. Further study is required in the future to model CSC security threats from
power grid sub-station systems and from different attack scenarios. We are also looking to determine
cybercrime risks in cyber physical systems. Further study will include a detailed analysis of threats
using machine learning techniques.
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